The development of the law of self-determination has been stagnant in terms of
I. Introduction
The discussion on self-determination is of paramount importance in the evolution of human history towards the highest level of society -sovereign Statehood. 1 It is justified by the criteria of sharing a territory, 2 which might be formed in the struggle of power and ideas, 3 progress through self-contemplation and self-identification, along with the ability to declare this status to others. 4 The concept was originally developed in the modern Europe and the US as the free determination of people for their own political status.
5
The notion of self-determination was articulated in the context of the era of liberalization of the Europe. Rosas aptly highlighted that it "was for a long time denied or at least belittled as a legal right, bestowed upon a collective entity distinct from the state." 6 Woodrow Wilson in his famous political statement of January 8, 1918 also indicated that the US aimed to secure a "fair and just peace" by employing the "principle of national self-determination." inspired by the notion of democracy which was developed through the two World Wars, 11 following the downfall of four big empires, i.e., Roman, German, AustroHungarian, and Turkish, leading to decolonization across the world.
12
Under the UN Charter, self-determination is a fundamental ground for achieving universal peace and promoting friendly relations among the nations. Surprisingly, this idea was ignited under colonial rule as a basis for anti-colonial movements. The UN initiated the decolonization project under the Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee for Decolonization (Committee of 24), which was successfully applied in 83 territories, including 72 cases of the NSGT and 11 Trust Territories between 1945 and 1965. 13 The new self-determination movements after this time 14 is known as "post-colonial self-determination." 15 In this context, the role of international law and its institutions in developing the law of self-determination have been contentious. 16 The different circumstances of self-determination claims 17 have not been followed by justifiable rules, but influenced by a temporary political situation 18 and the interests of hegemonic powers in maintaining the world order.
19
It is not surprising that self-determination, although theoretically recognized in many international documents, remains vague in its application. 20 Musgrave has described this situation in the following manner:
nonselfgov.shtml (last visited on May 9, 2016). 11 a. CaSSeSe, Self-DeteRmInatIon of peopleS, a legal ReappRaISal 321 (1995 Simultaneously, many self-determination movements were considered as preoccupied with territory and resources without consideration of their capacity to exist as a statehood.
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The rhetoric of self-determination in international law was not always in line with the practice of self-determination movements on the ground. The former is normative in nature, undefined in terms of scope and content, and characterised by a lack of enforcement mechanisms, while the latter, as a tool for the pursuit of freedom from a government. 24 A connecting guideline is thus needed.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the feasibility of developing such a guideline for the application of self-determination either for autonomy or independence in a postcolonial context. To attain the purpose, the paper is divided into four main parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will define postcolonial self-determination. Part three will shed focus on the development of a guideline for its application.
II. Postcolonial Self-Determination: Two Approaches
Two approaches of the UN system for the decolonization program can be traced.
21 t. muSgRaVe, Self-DeteRmInatIon anD natIonal mInoRItIeS 91 (1997).
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The first one is a 'top down' approach, by which the interest of former colonial powers are prevailed in the transferring territory to the chosen regimes in order to maintain their powers even after their independence. 25 In this case, a colonial power liberalized some of its colonies under the concept of self-determination and at the same time maintained the colonial rule in others without legitimate reasons.
26
This two-tier policy has then made a negative influence on other movements in the postcolonial era by increasing perception of a 'historical wrong' created by the notion of self-determination as shown at those cases as the division of Pakistan into the west and the east (which became Bangladesh), East Timor, West Papua, and Aceh in Indonesia. The second one is the justification approach, where the peoples justify their struggle for freedom from colonial powers with self-determination. E.g., the Third World States have been considering their independence as a result of a long and massive struggle, instead of a gift or a transfer of territory under the decolonization project. 27 The ongoing self-determination movements in the postcolonial context contribute to the overall ambiguity of this principle, 28 including 'uncertainty' about a justification for intervention, basis for secession, or special arrangements within a State.
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A notable example of State secession is the Canadian province of Quebec, which demanded cessation through a referendum in 1995. The Supreme Court of Canada indicated the scenario in which people's rights would include a right to secede, "when a people are oppressed and when a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development." 30 This understanding has conceptualized a remedial character of postcolonial selfdetermination that becomes a domain of human rights law, by which the interest of victims of a group under a State jurisdiction must be taken into account. Equally, the division of external and internal self-determination might not be useful to the colonial and postcolonial context. It may support the argument that for the colonial period self-determination was merely applicable with respect to external meaning, but during the postcolonial era both external and internal selfdetermination can be interchangeably applied.
31 External self-determination is the right to freedom from hegemony or colonization by other States or empires. Meanwhile, internal self-determination denotes the right of either the people in a country or a minority group of that country for greater autonomy in politics, economy, religion, and culture. 32 However, this friction would invoke the concept of "internal affair of a State" used mostly by governments to maintain its territory, without due consideration to international customary laws on human rights. 33 This conceptual shift has brought more controversial interpretations and application. Antonio Cassese described:
Current international law is blind to the demands of ethnic group and national, religious, cultural, or linguistic minorities. Not only does international law refrain from granting any right of internal or external self-determination to these groups, but it also fails to provide any alternatives remedy to the present plight of so many of them.
34
The meaning of self-determination in the common Article 1 of the two International Human Rights Covenants has transformed an external (independent) into an internal (autonomy) self-determination. 35 The language of self-determination might have not been clearly interpreted since then. Moreover, the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 12 has excluded self-determination as the right of a people to be enforced. 36 Rather, it has coped with individual rights as stated in the be subject to the discretion of national and international support.
Consequently, self-determination would have two paradoxical meanings shifting in between internal self-determination providing the people with a degree of autonomy, and external self-determination recognising the peoples' claim to a new State. 38 This might be relevant questions of postcolonial self-determination under the current international human rights law system. However, it remains unclear in terms of normative standards, institutional arrangements, and international community awareness development.
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III. Developing a Guideline for the Application of Postcolonial Self-Determination
A. Normative Framework Development
Self-determination has frequently been referred to in many international legal documents with reference to two major approaches. One is that self-determination is the right of a colonised people to create a State both free from colonial power and in the context of other particular conditions in the postcolonial period. The other is that self-determination is the right of the people to demand autonomy within a State. The first meaning can be observed extensively from the UN Charter, the 1960 Declaration on Decolonisation, the 1970 Declaration on the Principle of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and so forth, while the second meaning can be found in the common Article 1 of the two International Human Rights Covenants. 40 This formulation was explicitly written as a means to achieve the purposes of the UN Charter for universal peace and friendly relations among nations. 41 It was then clarified in the colonial context through several repetitive resolutions by the UN General Assembly 42 and developed into the internal meaning of international human rights law under the common Article 1 (1) of the two Covenants which states that: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. [Emphasis added] By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The codification of 'internal meaning' in the Covenants fundamentally upgraded the self-determination principle from a non-binding rule (soft law) to a binding principle (hard law) under international law. As self-determination was finally 'internalized,' its scope, content and application procedures became obscure. The Human Rights Committee ("HRC") has maintained this stance through its General Comment 12 on common Article 1 without specifics as to the meaning of the right by primarily repeating the language of the Covenant text. 43 Unlike other forms of human rights, self-determination is considered a collective right excluded from the Human Rights Council complaint procedure. 44 It is intended to place an obligation on a State to protect its people and to improve their economic, social and cultural lives. As this obligation is not monitored by the international legal system, 45 its enforcement mechanism would largely be determined on a caseby-case basis within State jurisdiction. Self-determination has something to do with normative obligation of the State to protect its sub-states or marginalized people with a distinct historical, linguistic, religious, ceremonial, institutional structure as well as land ownership within that territory. 46 There are thus a few cases in which external self-determination might be exercised in the current context. It may occur because of the lack of ability, willingness, or failure of a State to negotiate for the rights of its minority through the internal self-determination mechanisms, particularly in case of grave human rights violation or "crimes against humanity." 47 The meaning of internal self-determination under the international human rights law would thus be questionable if external selfdetermination is applied without further guidelines and authoritative interpretation. In this regard, restoring a normative framework might be undertaken through the visited on May 9, 2016). 
Revising Common Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Covenants
Article 1 of the Covenants has been a benchmark of the law of self-determination as it has transformed the concept of self-determination from the purposive character of Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter into a legal right under international human rights law. This principle of self-determination has also been shifted from merely being a tool of colonised peoples in their pursuit of independence to an understanding of autonomy within a sovereign State.
It is a matter of contention that the language of the common Article 1 to the Covenants is ambiguous. The term, 'all people' can be interpreted in a way that not every single person but to certain people with certain qualifications would have such right to exercise. For internal use, it is subject to negotiation of a people with the central government, while, for external use, it is subject to recognition from both the central government and the international community. Meanwhile, "freely determines political status" might mean that every group of people in the world have the freedom to decide their own political status in terms of an independent statehood. Such an understanding has triggered many self-determination movements anticipating international support. At the same time, they have circumvented the principle of territorial integrity of the State in which they are operating. In this sense, it should be recommended to revise common Article 1 to read: "All people have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they may freely negotiate their political status." [Emphasis added] Replacing 'freely determine' with 'freely negotiate' would leave space for conflict resolution internally within the international human rights law system, while the HRC and other international institutions could observe such negotiations for the benefit of the parties involved. 48 Additionally, the purpose of the self-determination principle should be considered as referring to Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter in this revision. In the end, common Article 1 of the Covenants should be amended as follows: This revision could mitigate the normative conflict between the absolute selfdetermination and the territorial sovereignty of States, harmonizing the purposes of internal and external self-determination.
Defining the Content and Scope of Self-determination
After analyzing the essential meaning of self-determination under international law, focus can be given on analyzing specific circumstances. The term, "remedial self-determination" 49 can be employed in terms of repairing and preventing the persistent violation of rights of the people concerned, both for internal and external purposes. The proposed remedial grounds for postcolonial self-determination can be divided into four circumstances. First, it is 'remedial' in terms of restoring unsettled cases of the UN Trust and NSGT project, such as Palestine, Kurdistan, Western Sahara, Gibraltar, 50 Tibet, Somaliland, Kashmir, etc. 51 In these cases, uti possidetis was wrongly applied in the course of decolonization, or an entity was wrongfully incorporated into the newly independent State. 52 This refers to remedying prior injustice, 53 which might be widely accepted by the international community. It "has broad support in the legal literature" and "should be acknowledged as part and parcel of positive law." 54 Dickinson, however, argues that the application of remedial self-determination refers to: "… whether injustices capable of generating a right to secede exist; and … whether the injustices can be resolved without resorting to the ultimate sanction of secession." 55 That is to say that secession is the final option only when internal selfdetermination is considered to have failed. Second, the remedial solution should be referred to the persisting repressive government against its people. It might be less related to international law than the previous cases because these collapses were caused mainly by the domestic institution. However, this manmade disaster is an object of international humanitarian intervention.
Fourth, internal self-determination should be considered. This is a remedy for severely discriminated or imbalanced political and economic power distribution system within a State. A recent example is the special autonomy of Aceh province from the Indonesian government. It was a beneficial solution through a peace agreement of Helsinki 2005 after a long lasting armed conflict between the Aceh Free Movement and Indonesia. 61 These four divisions can be comprehensively understood as "a remedy for injustice," 62 wherein a group of people in a distinct territory have been effectively denied enforcement of their right to self-determination or autonomy by the ruling governments' persistent violation of peremptory norms. In this sense, the remedial self-determination operated well in the cases of Kosovo and Southern Sudan in the postcolonial context. 63 As regards the legitimacy of this model of self-determination, Thomas Simon has proposed the assessment of: (1) parent States against the seceding territory and its people, such as human rights violation; and (3) whether the claimant has been seriously impacted by the violation of peremptory norms. This assessment module was applied with satisfaction in the Kosovo case, which had a weak relationship with Serbia committing inhuman crimes. 64 The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") confirmed the legality of the unilateral declaration of Kosovos' independence. 65 It could be also referred to as an example of the remedial understanding of self-determination in a postcolonial context. 66 
Defining and Demonstrating People's Concern
Historically, the colonial people were the original beneficiaries of the right of self-determination in the imperialist era. They, however, excluded minority and indigenous peoples in the postcolonial context. Those who were colonised in a distinct territory used to be separated from the colonial power by global distance pushing their efforts to seek the independence. 67 As the legitimacy of political arrangements depends upon the will of the people in a democratic society, 68 this would be also a constitutional basis for the people in a defined territory to be liberated from a colonial power. In the postcolonial context, however, people who might legitimately use the right of self-determination remain questionable as there is no clear definition of 'people' in international law. 71 Self-determination for indigenous minorities were also developed within the scope of individual concerns under the current international human rights protection system. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 2007("UNDRIP") 72 has clearly defined that indigenous self-determination is to be understood as applying to internal self-determination in terms of freedom to express their concerns in politics, economics and culture. 73 The concept, 'indigenous people' is of great relevance to the circumstances in Australia with its aboriginal people 74 and in the US with the Native Americans, more than those in the postcolonial world. 75 The essential issue for indigenous people is "a right over their collective ancestral territories," which is termed as 'territorial minorities.' 76 State and the wider notion of minority and indigenous rights. However, it can also stretch to a collective right for a wider degree of autonomy within a State. External self-determination in terms of a collective meaning in line with the "political selfdetermination (paragraph 1)" 80 does not correspond with the term "minority and indigenous people" under the current arrangement. However, the HRC asks States to provide reports on common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights, under the current human rights mechanism without clarifying whether this applies to an internal or external meaning. Eventually, many States completely ignored Article 1 in their report, as they might be cautious with the emergence of external self-determination.
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One might turn towards Anaya's distinction between the constitutive and ongoing aspects of self-determination. Constitutive self-determination means that the political institutions of a State must be built through the participation of the people, as they have a right to "freely determine their political status" in the colonial context, 82 while on-going self-determination means that "people may live and develop freely under the governing institutional order." 83 It is then applied as an internal aspect of self-determination for the postcolonial context. The HRC also distinguishes the application of Article 1 from that of Article 25 (rights to participation), as Article 1 concerns the collective rights of the people to choose their own form of government within a State and Article 25 is concerned with the public affairs of government. 84 The Committee held that Article 1 can be realized following the participation of all people in public life, which in turn means that the rights identified in Article 25 must be ensured and guaranteed. 85 This, however, has made more confusion over both internal and external self-determination since Article 27 (right of minorities) clearly applies to the right of individuals belonging to minorities to enjoy a particular culture, including a collective element. 86 The right of minorities can thus cover the right of indigenous people, but it is rather different from the right of self-determination as a collective right of people within a State to form their autonomous government in any sense.
Procedural Development
There is a confusion of common Article 1 of the Covenants on whether the complaints procedure should be carried out through an individual or collective channel. Under the Optional Protocol ("OP") 1, the HRC can only receive individual complaints against the States. The Committee's General Comment 12, however, has stressed that self-determination is a collective right, not individual, so that the right under the current arrangement should be unenforceable. In practice, the Committee has rejected the Ominayak case affirming that: "The author, as an individual, could not claim under the OP to be a victim of a violation of the right to self-determination […] which deals with rights conferred upon peoples as such." 87 On the one hand, the HRC has invited the States to report on compliance of Article 1, while, on the other hand, it has rejected the complaints brought by the peoples against the States as being incompatible with OP 1 and General Comment 12. 88 On the violation of Article 1, the Committee has rejected the Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada case, since Mikmaq could not claim to be an individual victim in accordance with the OP. 89 There is no explanation on how 'people' are entitled to claim to the HRC, as Article 1 of the Covenants has still excluded the OP and the Committee's legal positions. In relation to Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, Roger Errera raised a question concerning the ambiguous interpretation of people's qualification to the right of self-determination for both internal and external parameters under the OP. 90 Thus, a complaint mechanism should be established for the collective right of selfdetermination by revising the OP and General Comment 12 in order to provide a space for self-determination movements to claim statehood under international human rights protection mechanisms. 2011, the referendum on Crimea in Ukraine, the Scottish independence referendum in the UK, 104 and Catalonia in Spain, all during 2014. Now is the time to establish new and appropriate institutions in order to respond to such ongoing questions of self-determination. The HRC and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, however, has left Article 1 of the Covenant on self-determination uncertain. 105 These committees reported the policies of a member State to its citizens to the General Assembly, but are not much concerned with the exercise of selfdetermination in practice. It can be observed in the dismissal of the said practice by General Comment 12.
B. Strengthening Institutional Mechanism Development
Due to the absence of enforcement mechanism of these rights, self-determination movements in the postcolonial period are managed by the common procedures of the UN regarding maintenance of global peace and security. The Security Council and the General Assembly are authorized to intervene in domestic affairs of a member State when the conflicts are considered to have severely negative influences on human rights violations. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the Security Council's permanent members, however, are not fully out of this accusation of violation of human rights as clearly shown in cases, e.g., the UK with Scotland, France with Corsica, China with Tibet, and Russia with Crimea. 106 It would imply that the Security Council might have prevented further developments of the laws of selfdetermination for the postcolonial context. 107 In some cases, the UN and its organs have been involved in self-determination based conflicts through collective forces or monitoring missions, when humanitarian crises occurred. However, the supports to some self-determination claims would be risky to fuel up the negative impact on the conflicts. 108 The ICJ has been also playing pivotal role in resolving some thorny legal questions arising on self-determination claims 109 by adjudication and advisory opinions. 110 Noticeable examples are the cases concerning South West Africa (Namibia), 111 Northern Cameroon, 112 Western Sahara, 113 East Timor, 114 and Kosovo.
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The ICJ generally "favoured the solution most consistent with the self-determination of the people concerned and affirmed the validity of the legal principle concerned with a colonial territory." 116 Such judicial function, however, has not significantly contributed to the development of an institutional framework for self-determination. As the current institutional arrangements for the settlement of self-determination conflicts have been considered divergent, sporadic and unsystematic, a new institution would be required to cope up with this in more comprehensive ways. The HRC can be the most likely institution to lead this role for several reasons. First, self-determination has been already stipulated in Article 1 of the two Covenants, especially on the implementation of which the Council has jurisdiction. Second, the Security Council was not found fair and consistent in either supporting some selfdetermination movements or rejecting others. Third, it is difficult to effectively settle postcolonial self-determination movements because the Trusteeship Council was closed in 1994 and Committee 24 is merely working for the 16 remaining NSGTs. For this goal, the OP and General Comment 12 should be revised and the guidelines should be drafted.
The guidelines would propose that the role of the HRC be strengthened: (1) to receive of peoples' self-determination claims; (2) to identify the degree and validity of self-determination claims; (3) to initiate internal negotiations with the existing States concerned; to provide recommendations for the settlement of problems between a people and the State in which they reside; and (4) to actively educate the people concerned on the implications of the process of self-determination on a long term basis. In some cases, finally, the Committee can seek the advisory opinions from the ICJ for the settlement of the self-determination movement in question. This Committee would decide which movement has the potential for independent statehood and when its supervision for statehood scheme is required in a transitional period. 117 Other movements should also be guided in such a way as to achieve an appropriate autonomy from its internal self-determination. When the initial effort to internally resolve the conflict through negotiations between the people and the State would be prevalent, the Committee should offer the first solution for a degree of autonomy. Otherwise, the persistent repression by a government over its people will be unavoidable. Here, the Committee can, after careful consideration, offer a proposal for remedial self-determination.
C. Developing Awareness of the International Community
The UN has tried to end or slow down the growing number of States since the end of the decolonization process. The UN and its organs, however, have failed to provide well-informed education to the international community on the topic of self-determination. As a result, many newly emerged self-determination movements were passionately expectant of a better life by means of achieving statehood. On the other side, there is still a tendency to preserve status quo of national borders after decolonisation. Changing borders can be viewed as 'instability' around the world. The former UN Secretary General U Thant stated: "The United Nations' attitude is unequivocal. As an international organization, the UN has never accepted and does not accept, and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its member state."
118 His remarks relate to the principle of the inviolability of national borders and the goal of non-interference in internal affairs of other States in keeping with the principle of territorial sovereignty. 119 This principle abstained the UN from intervening in civil wars of self-determination, inter alia, in Nigeria in the late 1960s, Pakistan in 1970s, Indonesia in 1990s, etc.
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Many developing countries, however, have not been fully aware of their role in potential settlement of self-determination disputes through human right-based approaches. Such failures have worsened the situation. Tensions have risen to the level of armed conflict or civil war with gross human rights violations. Therefore, the existing distinction between external and internal self-determination might have 117 Supra note 63. 118 Supra note 47. 119 Supra note 19, at xi. 120 Id. at xi.
However, the failure of settling self-determination claims in many States would have threatened international peace and security. This fuels the emergence of a "remedial self-determination," encompassing those four circumstances as: (1) restoration of the historical wrong in the decolonization process; (2) response to the dissolution of the State; (3) freedom from persistently repressive government practices; and (4) provision of a degree of autonomy for certain sub-states. To this end, the development of precise guidelines for these applications is required to cover normative, institutional, and international awareness.
It is eventually argued that the creation of a State is not the only ultimate goal of the people; they further attempt for a better life with peace and security for their future. However, many self-determination movements have been trapped in their longing for statehood, rather than understanding the means to achieve a higher living standard in the future, a goal which could be negotiated within the existing framework of the international society based on sovereign States. It is hoped that through appropriate education of these guidelines, many States and self-determination movements can gain insight of a better way in terms of avoiding both human rights violation and armed conflicts. A framework for applying this principle would contribute to narrowing the gap between the romantic ideal of selfdetermination and its application on the ground for maximum benefit of people.
